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Fiscal solvency has become a popular phenomenon in numerous decentralizing countries 
in recent years. The ability to mobilize adequate revenue to fund expenditure in a given 
budget period, and provide public goods and services, makes fiscal solvency very 
pertinent, especially in local government. However, policy, practice, and research, claim 
that most local entities, both in the developed and developing world, rarely achieve 
required fiscal solvency standards. While no clear explanation of the problem abounds, 
digital financial inclusion dominates the ongoing debate. Besides, regulation is also 
considered a very crucial factor for fiscal solvency. This study examines the probable 
mediation effect regulation has on the digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency 
relationship in local governments in Uganda, East Africa. Based on a cross-sectional 
research design, data were collected from 21 districts, nine municipalities, and many sub-
counties in the country’s post-conflict northern regions. The data were then subjected to 
structural equation modeling analysis. Its findings reveal that digital financial inclusion 
explains changes in fiscal solvency in surveyed local governments. Moreover, regulation 
has an indirect influence on the digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency formation. 
Findings implications to practice and theory are discussed, and future research direction 
is provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is quite recent that government entities' fiscal solvency started to receive attention 
from policy, practice, and research. Previously restricted to fiscal federalism specialist 
domains, lack of fiscal solvency has over time undermined resource management in 
public units unnoticed (Sepulveda & Martinez-Vazquez, 2011; Thornton, 2007). The 
malaise, exacerbated by corruption and other malpractices, dominates local government 
financial and budgetary structures, especially in newly decentralizing countries of the 
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region local entities, Uganda inclusive, have been particularly vulnerable, given their 
relatively weak managerial capabilities and non-punitive budgetary regulations 
(Gauthier, 2001; Talvi & Végh, 2005). 
Gauthier (2001) and Lessman (2012) associate the fiscal health of government 
(especially local governments) with fiscal solvency. Public fiscal health is a three-
dimensional phenomenon: fiscal position, fiscal condition, and economic condition. An 
entity’s fiscal position relates to the state of its assets and liabilities. These require 
continuous cash flows or the ability for conversion to cash in the short-term (liquidity) 
(Lessman, 2012). 
Government fiscal condition is about its aptitude to meet financial obligations to, 
say, suppliers, creditors, and lenders as they fall due. Often referred to as fiscal solvency, 
state when the entity can service its financial obligations to concerned constituents now 
and in the future (Gauthier, 2001; Thornton, 2007). Previous studies (e.g., Alesina, Baqir 
& Easterly, 1999) have long captured economic conditions to embrace the entire 
government fiscal health as a whole. Specifically, it is the entity's potential to meet 
financial obligations and service delivery commitments within the set budgetary 
framework (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005). 
Fiscal solvency, especially in fiscal federalism structures, can be clearly understood 
from four contexts; cash, budgetary, long-run, and service-level solvency (Gauthier, 
2001; Reinikka & Svensson, 2006). Cash-related solvency is the entity’s ability to 
generate adequate cash amounts over, say, 30-60 days to service its recurrent bills. 
Budgetary solvency can mobilize enough revenue over the normal budgetary timespan to 
finance expenditure and yet without entering into debt. Long-run solvency is a situation 
when a public entity is sustainably able to meet all its administrative and other costs over 
a long time (Gauthier, 2001). 
Service-level solvency relates to that component of financial health when the 
government can render services at the local communities' level and quality satisfactorily. 
The services may include education, health, road networks, water, and sanitation 
(Gauthier, 2001; Talvi & Végh, 2005). 
Conventional empirical evidence (e.g., Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Reinikka 
& Svensson, 2006; Thornton, 2007) provides that majority localities often violate 
budgetary and service delivery mandates relative to cash and long-run solvency 
dimensions. Several scholars (Morawczynski, 2009; Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 2005; 
Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013) assert that dynamics largely cause violation of budgetary 
and service delivery obligations in local agencies in digital financial inclusion. 
Electronic or e-financial mechanisms commonly exclude local communities 
incapacitating them from paying local taxes required for budgetary purposes. Resultant 
constrained budgets create service delivery setbacks (Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 2005; 
Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). 
Besides, locality budgetary and service delivery challenges are also closely 
associated with fiscal solvency regulation (de Mello, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995). Fiscal 
federalism in general and fiscal solvency is surrounded by a series of laws and statutes 
meant to enhance efficiency and transparency. Prud’homme (1995) argues that, given that 
such regulation is created at the center, it rarely captures local entities' operational 
realities. It exposes most agencies to budgetary and service delivery risks (Otenyo & Lind, 
2004; Prud’homme, 1995). 
This research is a close analysis of the digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency 
relationship in African-based local governments. Specifically, regulation, a factor to 
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mediator in the relationship. In Uganda, local government fiscal solvency concerns, an 
East African country applauded for its proficient fiscal federalism mechanism, are used 
as a proxy. The focus is on local entities' operations located in the country’s post-conflict 
northern regions of West Nile, Northern (Acholi and Lango areas), and Karamoja.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
Fiscal solvency 
In local government, fiscal solvency is a fiscal condition that unveils an entity's 
ability to meet its financial obligations to suppliers, creditors, and lenders as they fall due 
(Gauthier, 2001; Thornton, 2007). Local entities are particularly obliged to meet their 
service mandate to the communities now and in the future. 
Incidentally, effectively meeting that mandate on a sustainable basis is a function 
of multiple factors. Common factors are largely environmental, organizational, and 
financial (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Thornton, 2007). 
According to Gauthier (2001) and Talvi & Végh (2005), the entity environment 
encompasses community needs and resource structure, political culture, and inter-
governmental constraints. The entity must appreciate its community population age, 
income-generating capacity, and employment potential from the community needs and 
resource structure context. Such factors are critical for planning and budgeting necessary 
in fulfilling service delivery obligations (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Talvi & Végh, 
2005). 
The locality also needs to understand the partisan political formation under which 
it is operating. Politics significantly influence resource allocation and government 
program management (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Gauthier, 2001). Moreover, various 
local governments fail to realize expected fiscal solvency criteria due to constraints rooted 
in inter-governmental fiscal relations. These encompass the management of 
intergovernmental transfers (grants) and budgetary regulations (Alesina, Baqir & 
Easterly, 1999; Reinikka & Svensson, 2006).  
At the organizational level, the administrative machinery employed and staff 
technical capacity to make effective fiscal decisions seriously impact entity fiscal 
solvency.  Sepulveda & Martinez-Vazquez (2011) noted that rampant corruption and 
bureaucratic practices surrounding several local governments, especially in Africa, are 
associated with organizational impediments. In most jurisdictions of Africa, several local 
entity administrators and departmental heads lack the technical competence required to 
constitute and interpret a balanced budget (Lessman, 2012; Sepulveda & Martinez-
Vazquez, 2011). 
Financial factors that influence local authorities relate to revenue mobilization 
(growth and source diversity), expenditure (setting priorities, meeting mandates, and 
expenditure performance), and program management (maintenance and capital outlay 
efficiency). These factors drive fiscal solvency (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Talvi & 
Végh, 2005). 
Fiscal efficiency theory (King, 1984; Musgrave & Musgrave, 1980; Oates, 1972) is 
the dominant theoretical underpinning that attempts to explain local entity fiscal 
condition. The theory holds that local taxes embrace several operational features capable 
of financially supporting decentralized public expenditure systems if managed well. For 
instance, local tax bases should be neither very mobile nor unevenly distributed amongst 
the various local jurisdictions (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1980; Oates, 1972). 
In dynamic environments, say those occasioned by rapid technological mobility, 
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society re-location will affect total revenue collected and limit entity capacity to adjust 
tax rates accordingly. Prompt tax adjustments made to suit budget solvency at a particular 
period is critical for ultimate entity budget performance (King, 1984; Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 1980). The entity’s environmental-organizational-financial factors 
triangulation outlined above seriously affects its budgetary and service-level solvency. 
In Uganda, most local governments, especially those emerging from civil conflict, 
frequently fall victim to the fiscal solvency trap. Quite often, less local revenue is 
collected than what is budgeted for smaller amounts released by the central government 
in grants. Coupled with constrained donor aid support, it is common that their budgets 
rarely perform (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006). 
Budgets in local governments in the West Nile, Northern, and Karamoja regions 
are very prone to fiscal solvency setbacks. As communities struggle to cope-up 
economically with those of other regions in the country, budgetary legislation requires 
that they must also operate functioning budgets (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006). Ultimately, 
non-performing budgets in the regions have inevitably affected the quality of service 
delivery. Thus, the regions’ level of education, health services, road networks, and water 
and sanitation remains largely below average (Talvi & Végh, 2005). 
Digital financial inclusion 
Large sections of local community populations save, send money, and even access 
loans through financial systems that are neither supervised nor regulated. This practice, 
typical of the developing world and currently widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
constitutes the so-called shadow or informal cash-based economy (Morawczynski, 2009; 
Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
Digital financial inclusion research (Gilbert, 2005; Madon, 2005; Salvador, Sherry 
& Urrutia, 2005) reveals that such communities comprise the biggest percentage, at least 
70%, of the entire population of respective countries. Their inclusion in the formal digital 
financial sector would lead to national economic growth and significantly reduce poverty 
(Madon, 2005; Salvador et al., 2005). 
Commonly defined as digital access to and applying financial services by under-
served or entirely excluded populations (Morawczynski, 2009; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007; 
Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013), digital financial inclusion mechanisms only require 
suitable adjustments to benefit the affected groups. 
Phillips & Ilcan (2007) suggest that tailoring the mechanisms to customer needs, 
responsible delivery, affordability, and cost-effectiveness to service providers would 
significantly enhance that objective's attainment. 
The actor-network theory (Green, Hull, McMeekin & Walsh, 1999; Hanseth, 
Monteiro & Hatling, 1996) suggests a combination of agency and structure for effective 
digital financial inclusion. Besides, this leading theoretical direction asserts that neither 
the agency nor the structure should operate independently of the other. In practice, society 
consists of human and non-human players who foster digital financial activity (Hanseth, 
Monteiro & Hatling, 1996). Conventional agency-structure configurations in Africa are 
driven by a transaction platform, retail agents, and some devices (Madon, 2005; 
Morawczynski, 2009; Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
Transaction platform 
 The platform makes it possible for customers to use the device to transact; that is, 
make and receive payments, transfer, and store money electronically with financial or 
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Bello & Adenuga, 2013). Moreover, it can accommodate small and unpredictable cash 
flows affordable by most poverty-stricken and village-resident populations. 
Data platforms create through continuous customer interaction enable financial 
institutions to develop pro-poor easy-to-repay products. Furthermore, most transactional 
platforms engaged are acclaimed for promoting easy accessibility to other financial 
products such as loans, insurance, interest-based savings, and investments 
(Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
In general terms, transactional platforms have generated unprecedented financial 
service demand that has impacted most local populations' income capacities. Notable 
examples in Africa include Tigo Family Care insurance (Ghana), Commercial Bank of 
Africa-oriented M-Shwari consumer loans and M-Pesa (Kenya), Nigeria’s FirstMonie, 
and MTN and Airtel (Uganda). 
Recently, Uganda-based MTN and Airtel e-financial institutions launched almost 
similar products to benefit the largely rural-based poor. The post-conflict communities 
are an active consumer group of the services offered (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 
2015). The services have not only improved their livelihoods, but the interaction has 
boosted local business activity. Depending on local entity capacity to mobilize local taxes, 
enhanced business leverage significantly influences societal contribution to budgeting 
and service delivery (Olayinka, 2015; Salvador et al., 2005). The attribute transactional 
platform thus substantiates the proposal of the following hypothesis: 
H1: Digital transaction platform relates positively to fiscal solvency.  
Retail  agents 
Retail agents are registered and regulated individuals or institutions that operate 
digital devices to help customers convert cash to electronically-stored value or the other 
way around. Yakub et al. (2013) identify the agents with facilities linked to 
communication infrastructure capable of transmitting and receiving customer monetary 
transaction details. Consistent with the actor-network theory (Green, Hull, McMeekin & 
Walsh, 1999; Hanseth, Monteiro & Hatling, 1996), agents are the actors whose 
intervention in the platform-device-customer connections renders the entire digital 
financial inclusion machine very effective. 
As a contribution to local entity fiscal solvency, retail agents expose local 
community digital financial facility users (taxpayers and service recipients) to business 
efficiency that ultimately strengthens their earning power (Phillips & Ilcan, 2007). 
However, where regulation is weak, retail agents may cause serious risks to both service 
providers and customers. According to Madon (2005), service providers are vulnerable 
to agent-oriented operational and even cyber-related risks such as fraud, poor cash 
management, inefficient data management, and frequent errors. These setbacks hamper 
customer participation and frustrate their business activity (Madon, 2005; Schneider & 
Enste, 2000). 
Besides, given their limited financial management aptitude, most agents can 
notably comply with anti-money laundering regulations and customer due diligence 
requirements. Empirical evidence (Morawczynski, 2009; Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 
2005) further indicates that some agents over-charge customers or involve abusive 
language, which eventually leads to violation of personal data confidentiality. 
In sum, both the positive and negative contributions retail agents make to the digital 
financial inclusion-customer (community) equation have a surmountable bearing on the 
local government's fiscal solvency drive. Post-conflict northern Uganda local 
communities and their local governments are in no way immune to the MTN-Airtel retail 
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services to be part of the global digital financial society and are forced to bear with its 
dynamics (Olayinka, 2015; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). The retail agents construct 
leads to the following prediction:  
H2: Retail agents’ activities relate positively to fiscal solvency. 
Devices 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the mobile phone dominates the digital financial device 
structure (Morawczynski, 2009; Salvador et al., 2005). All homes have mobile phones, 
held for both communication and money transfer purposes. In most jurisdictions, all 
mobile phone devices are registered. Registration of phone owners is undertaken to 
facilitate personal holder security, curb phone theft, and, most importantly, check cyber-
related financial transfer crimes (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
Some scholars (Madon, 2005; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007; Schneider & Enste, 2000) 
observe that phone owners and their devices' registration is a deliberate government 
strategic move. Essentially, registration reveals people’s incomes, spending habits, 
partisan political position, and their stand on the quality of public goods and services 
offered. To achieve this multi-dimensional strategic goal, the state often secretly institutes 
a digital communication monitoring system (phone tapping) (Phillips & Ilcan, 2007; 
Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
Local government officials in Uganda and the communities they serve, post-conflict 
northern regions inclusive, predominantly employ the mobile phone as the digital 
financial inclusion device. Thus, the device is considered instrumental in enhancing fiscal 
solvency in such entities (Morawczynski, 2009). In that consideration, we put forward 
the hypothesis: 
H3: Device application relates positively with fiscal solvency. 
Regulation  
Fiscal federalism entails the center transferring some of its fiscal administrative and 
management powers to sub-national entities (de Mello, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995). 
Ideally, the entities are given the constitution or some specific law mandate to raise local 
revenue (taxes) and carry out spending activities but strictly within a clearly-set 
regulatory framework.  
Raising revenue and spending is a function of two critical engagements, budgeting, 
and service delivery (Prud’homme, 1995; Reinnikka & Svensson, 2004). Since fiscal 
federalism, the bedrock of locality budgeting, is undertaken within some pre-conceived 
legal criteria, and it is therefore of little doubt that fiscal solvency is under regulatory 
oversight. Otenyo & Lind (2004) noted that regulation enhances budgetary discipline and 
promotes quality service delivery, especially in Africa's resource-constrained local 
entities. Budgetary discipline enables the entity to remain budget solvent for a long time 
(de Mello, 2000; Otenyo & Lind, 2004).  
The sudden emergence of digital financial inclusion culture in most developing 
countries and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa has caught most fiscal, regulatory 
mechanisms unawares (Madon, 2005; Olayinka, 2015; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). 
Few national constitutions and their offshoot sub-national entity laws capture the volatile 
operational elements of e-financial systems. Thus there is a high incidence of transaction 
platform-retail agent-device service violations with impunity, especially from the local 
government fiscal solvency context (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
In Uganda, the national constitution (1995), the Budget Act (2001), and the Local 
Government Act (1997 amended) constitute the regulatory framework governing fiscal 
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However, this legal structure is yet to fully-appreciate the digital financial inclusion-fiscal 
solvency linkages in local entities. Most of the governing guidelines are embedded in the 
financial services statutes, quite different from, say, those in the Local Government Act 
(1997 amended) (Reinnikka & Svensson 2004). From the preceding analysis, it also 
proposed that: 




          Data were collected from randomly and purposively-selected (Baruch & Holton 
2008; Creswell 2003) 21 districts, nine municipalities, and some sub-counties in post-
conflict northern and Karamoja regions Uganda. Local entities in the selected regions are 
susceptible to budget solvency challenges but are big consumers of the prestigious digital 
financial services (Morawczynski, 2009; Otenyo & Lind, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 
2006). A total of 250 structured questionnaires were distributed to various administrators 
and department heads, while civic leaders were interviewed. 
The questionnaire contained statement items regarding the study variables and 
their constructs built on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale was anchored on a “Strongly 
Disagree-Strongly Agree” configuration (Baruch & Holton, 2008; Cohen, Cohen, West 
& Aiken, 2003). The response rate from the unit of analysis, a district, the context was 
100% given that at least a questionnaire was received from each locality. Overall, 240 
questionnaires were received back, denoting a 96% unit of inquiry response rate. 
However, only 223 of them were taken on for hypothesis testing due to missing data and 
response inconsistence setbacks (Cohen et al., 2003; Creswell, 2003). 
Measures 
Fiscal solvency: The constructs operationalized fiscal solvency: budgetary activity and 
service-level operations (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Thornton, 2007). The budgetary 
activity was measured by scales adapted and modified from Thornton (2007) (α = 0.844). 
Sample statements: “This entity always balances its budgets.”; “Local revenue is often 
collected as budgeted for.” The service-level operations construct was assessed by 
modified versions of scales employed by Arzaghi & Henderson (2005) (α = 0.903). 
Sample statement: “The type of public goods and services offered by the entity is of quite 
good quality.” 
Digital financial inclusion: The transactional platform, retail agents, and devices are 
notable ingredients of digital financial inclusion (Morawczynski, 2009; Yakub, Bello & 
Adenuga, 2013). Transactional platform concerns were examined using tailored scales in 
Morawczynski (2009) (α = 0.826). Sample statements: “The platform is responsible for 
frequent network disruptions.”; “It cannot be easily modified to suit local service 
consumption circumstances.” The retail agents' role was assessed based on guidelines in 
Yakub, Bello & Adenuga (2013) (α = 0.877). Sample statements: “The agents are simply 
money-minded and are not bothered about customers.”; “Most of the agents are 
government spies and often violate customer confidentiality.” Finally, to verify the device 
construct's operations, scales in Madon (2005) (α = 0.894) were espoused. Sample 
statement: “Most mobile phones are too complicated to use.”; “The phones cannot be 
easily repaired.” 
Regulation: The study adopted the regulation as a probable mediating factor in the digital 
financial inclusion-fiscal solvency relationship. The variable was measured using 
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sample statements: “The existing budgetary laws and regulation have been suitably 
tailored to address local government realities.”; “The laws are easy to enforce.”; “Entity 
administrators easily understand them.” 
Control variables 
          Participants’ gender, education, position, and tenure are biographical components 
commonly considered very impactful to the local government's fiscal solvency 
management (Lessman, 2012; Talvi & Végh, 2005). Thus, to suppress their potential 
influence on the study findings, we included them in the study model as control variables. 
Gender was assessed dichotomously (0 = Female, N = 93; 1 = Male, N = 130). 
Educational status was coded as (1 = Secondary Level, N = 26; 2 = Diploma, N = 61; 3 
= First Degree, N = 97; 4 = Other Qualifications, N = 39). Job position was coded by (1 
= RDC, N = 25; 2 = CAO, N = 34; 3 = LC5 Chairpersons, N = 26; 4 = Heads of 
Department, N = 79; 5 = Councilors, N = 59). Tenure within the entity and serving under 
the current supervisor was captured to cover the range (up to 2 – 11 plus) years. 
Besides, we also identified and controlled one latent factor to expedite the 
statistical analysis required for Harman’s One Factor validity testing. Simulation research 
(e.g., Cheung & Lau 2008; Preacher & Kelley 2011) recommends control for latent 
factors to mitigate their potential negative effects on hypothesis testing and its outcome.  
Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out in four phases; first, participant biographical data 
were subjected to descriptive statistical analysis (Cohen et al., 2003; Creswell, 2003) to 
establish their status. Second, the study variables and constructs were also subjected to 
descriptive statistical analysis to generate their means and standard deviations. This phase 
also encompassed running variables and constructed inter-correlational tests and 
Cronbach alpha coefficients to establish instrument reliability (Baruch & Holton 2008; 
Cohen et al. 2003). 
Third, data were treated to multiple regression analysis to confirm their (R2) 
strength and their multicollinearity status (Baruch & Holton 2008; Cohen et al. 2003; 
Creswell 2003). Fourth, structural equation modeling (SEM) was tested on the data. The 
purpose of this test is to establish direct and indirect (mediation) effects of the various 
hypotheses (Barrett, 2007; Bollen, 1990; Cheung & Lau, 2008; Preacher & Kelley, 2011) 
proposed in the study. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Descriptive statistical analysis 
The results reveal that 54% of the 223 participants are male and in the (31-39) year 
age bracket. Most of them (52%) are married, educated to the level of Bachelor’s degree 
(22%), and have served in their respective positions for at most five years. 
These results are in line with previous research (Otenyo & Lind, 2004; Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2006), which indicates that fiscal and particularly budgetary activities in 
Uganda’s local governments are managed by fairly young and quite inexperienced male 
personnel. Besides, it is a workforce whose managerial and technical capacity is yet to 
develop (Otenyo & Lind, 2004). 
The descriptions of the research variables are given in Table 1. The results presented 
in Table 1, indicate quite sizeable mean and standard deviation values. The variable and 
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Table 1. Variable means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations 
Notes: M=Mean; SD=Standard Deviation; Reliabilities in parenthesis; **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); N=223. 
  Most inter-variable/construct correlation values are quite moderate and acceptable 
empirically (Cohen et al. 2003; Creswell 2003). For instance, fiscal solvency exhibits a 
positive and significant relationship with digital financial inclusion (r = .194, p < .01). It 
means that when digital financial inclusion improves by 19%, the standard of fiscal 
solvency also improves to a similar magnitude. On the contrary, regulation and digital 
financial inclusion relate negatively but significantly (r = -.167, p < .05). As digital 
financial inclusion gains ground to the extent of 17%, there could be lapses in the 
regulation of the same level. 
Moreover, regulation and fiscal solvency have a negative and significant 
relationship to the extent of (r = -.296, p < .01). As laws and regulations become stringent 
to a magnitude of 30%, fiscal solvency standards also deteriorate by the same percentage. 
Finally, budgetary activity is associated with retail agent operations to a positive and 
significant level of (r = .123, p < .05) interpreted along similar lines.  
Multiple regression and structural equation modeling 
Both regression and SEM analytical output are given in Table 2. 












  β SE β   TV VIF 
RGN Constant 3.775 1.408  2.680 **   
 Transactional Platform -.611 .195 -.556 -3.133 * .413 2.423 
 Retail Agents .508 .180 .508 2.825 * .401 2.484 
 Device .581 .183 .398 .728 ** .713 1.403 
 R2   .961     
 Adjusted R2   .922     
SEM Direct Effects        
H1 Transactional Platform --> Fiscal Solvency   -.195 -2.835 **   
H2 Retail Agents                 ----> Fiscal Solvency   .372 2.114 **   
H3 Device                            ----> Fiscal Solvency   .249 2.762 *   
 Indirect (Mediation) Effect        
H4 
Digital Financial Inclusion  ----> Fiscal Solvency   .266 2.407 *   
Regulation                              ---->  Fiscal Solvency   .158 4.656 **   
 Bootstrap: 95% Bias-Corrected  CIs: [.016; .093]       
Notes: HYP=Hypothesis; RGN=Multiple Regression; SEM=Structural Equation Modeling; H=Hypothesis;   
CI=Confidence Interval; TV=Tolerance Value; VIF= Variance Inflation Factor; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; 
Regression Equation: Fiscal Solvency = [3.775-.556Transactional Platform+.508Retail Agents+.398Device+e]. 
Variable direct effects were verified at two levels; multiple regression analysis 
levels and SEM level. From the multiple regressional contexts, results (Table 2), indicate 
a negative but significant transactional platform-fiscal solvency relationship (β=-.556; t-
value=-3.133). These results suggest that the study data do not support Hypothesis 1 in 
which a positive relationship had been predicted. In Hypothesis 2, it had been proposed 
Variable Item M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Transactional Platform 3.15 1.519 .825        
2.Retail Agents 2.97 1.557 -.364** .813       
3.Device 2.92 1.524 .185 -.390** .786      
4.Digital Financial Inclusion 2.85 1.558 .244 .304 -.489** .811     
5.Budgetary Activity 3.19 1.528 .319* .123* .270 -.315** .798    
6.Service-Level Operations 2.98 1.517 .252** -.248** .136* .284 -.332** .805   
7.Fiscal Solvency 3.04 1.586 -.259** .260** -.112* .194** .267 -.483** .884  
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that retail agents' activities relate positively to fiscal solvency. Data support that 
hypothesis (β=.508; t-value=2.825). Hypothesis 3 which stated that device and fiscal 
solvency hold a positive relationship, also secured data support as per the regression 
output (β=.398; t-value=.728). 
The regression results were founded on a regression model whose adjusted R2 value 
is quite robust (Adj. R2 = .922). Moreover, variable multicollinearity indicators meet the 
empirical standards; tolerance values (TV ≤ 1.00) and variance inflation factors (VIF ≤ 
10.00). The results indicate that the study variables hold no collinearity identities (Cohen 
et al. 2003; Creswell 2003). 
Firstly, structural equation modeling enabled the assessment of the common 
methods variance threat to the data set. Initially, data were subjected to exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) for screening and then to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for 
manipulation. Barrett (2000) & Bollen (1990) recommend creating two models; a multi-
factor measurement model and Harman’s one-factor model, whose goodness-of-fit 
indices can be compared to establish the presence of the common methods variance 
threat ably. 
The goodness-of fit indices for a six-factor (transactional platform, retail agents 
activities, device, budgetary activity, service-level operations, and regulation) model; 
namely, (χ2 =7.521; df = 9; χ2/df = 0.836; IFI = 0.970; TLI = 0.985; CFI = 0.977; 
RMSEA = 0.023; L.471, H.622) compared much better than those of the Harman’s 
latent-based single model (χ2 =12.803; df = 14; χ2/df = 0.915; IFI = 0.808; TLI = 0.905; 
CFI = 0.844; RMSEA = 0.219; L.098, H.123). 
The previous results of the two sets of goodness-of-fit indices signify the absence 
of common methods variance threat to the data (Barrett, 2000; Bollen, 1990; Preacher 
& Kelley, 2011). This finding is also a strong indication that there was both construct 
and discriminant validity of the instrument that was employed in the data collection 
process (Barrett, 2000; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). 
Structural equation modeling results further confirm inter-variable direct effects 
initially generated in the multiple regression model. Accordingly, transactional 
platform-fiscal solvency (β=-.195, t-value=2.835, p ˂ .01); retail agents-fiscal solvency 
(β=.372, t-value=2.114, p ˂ .01); device-fiscal solvency (β=.249, t-value=2.762, p ˂ 
.05). Data supported both Hypotheses 2 and 3 but did not support Hypothesis 1. 
It had been predicted in Hypothesis 4 that: regulation mediates the relationship 
between digital financial inclusion and fiscal solvency. Consistent with previous 
empirical literature (Kenny, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002), mediation results (Table 2) 
[β=.266, p < 0.05; β=.158, p < 0.01], indicate that Hypothesis 4 secured supported from 
the data. 
Two thousand five hundred mini-samples were created and subjected to structural 
equation modeling-based bootstrapping mediation testing. Bootstrapping generates two 
confidence intervals (lower and upper) that facilitate the determination of mediation 
presence. Mediation is considered existent and significant if no zero value lies in the 
confidence interval range (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The 10% effect size and 95% bias-
corrected zero-less confidence interval (CI): [.016; .093], confirms that Hypothesis 4 still 
secures support from the data (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). 
Discussion 
Attaining fiscal solvency is admittedly a big challenge to most local governments 
globally (Lessman, 2012; Talvi & Végh, 2005). The complication is rooted in the entity's 
capacity to sustainably operate functioning budgets and providing quality and satisfactory 
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collected and spent effectively. Public goods and services offered must be of the type that 
suitably fit community social and economic well-being (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005). 
Over the years, the complexity surrounding fiscal solvency has rendered policy, 
practice, and research inconclusive on its origin and the way forward. Previous studies 
claim that the digital financial inclusion-regulation blend is the most important solution 
to understand the extent to which digital financial inclusion-regulation traits contribute to 
violations of fiscal solvency behavior (Morawczynski, 2009; Otenyo & Lind, 2004; 
Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013).  
In this study, transactional platform, retail agents, and devices; attributes of digital 
financial inclusion (Olayinka, 2015; Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 2005), are examined as 
predictors of fiscal solvency. First, we hypothesized a transactional platform to predict 
fiscal solvency. The results did not support that hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). 
Secondly, it was projected that retail agents' activities predict fiscal solvency. The 
results supported the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, thirdly, we proposed that the 
trait device predicts fiscal solvency. This proposition was supported by the results 
(Hypothesis 3). Fourthly, we hypothesized regulation mediates the digital financial 
inclusion-fiscal solvency relationship. Results also supported that hypothesis (Hypothesis 
4). The hypotheses and their findings are discussed in the following sections. 
Transactional platform and fiscal solvency  
In line with Hypothesis 1, this research shows that changes in the transactional 
platform attribute of digital financial inclusion cannot change the local government's 
fiscal solvency. Importantly, we controlled for participant biographical characteristics 
such as gender, age, educational level, and tenure to influence fiscal solvency (Lessman, 
2012; Talvi & Végh, 2005). However, the transactional platform-fiscal solvency effect 
remains the same. Thus, we propose that a transactional platform may not, after all, be an 
antecedent of locality fiscal solvency. 
Much as the platform enhances the e-financial transfers and leads to ultimate 
improvements in societal incomes, most of the population is not connected to that facility 
(Morawczynski, 2009; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007). Therefore, this implies that e-platform 
may directly influence entity revenue generation through tax increments but little impact 
on service-level benefits. 
For instance, in several communities of Uganda’s post-conflict regions, schools are 
distantly located, health units lack relevant drugs, roads are impassable, and tap water is 
simply not available (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006). The over two-decade existence of 
digital financial systems in the regions has failed to help local authorities bring about any 
meaningful improvement in service delivery. Unfortunately, the local authorities neither 
have the technical capacity nor the mandate to initiate any platform structure changes. 
Local entities are mere recipients (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006; Talvi & Végh, 2005). 
Besides, the few studies conducted on digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency 
formation in other African-based local governments (Olayinka, 2015; Yakub, Bello & 
Adenuga, 2013) associate most platforms with very unpredictable and potentially 
unreliable connections, which often disorganize customer financial plans. 
In sum, the transactional platform-fiscal solvency configuration suggested at the 
introduction of Hypothesis 1 is contradicted by the findings based on the previous 
platform-fiscal solvency limitations. The challenge may constitute not only a promising 
direction for future research but also interventions. The transactional platform is 
purportedly that high-tech structure meant to provide a robust foundation for all 
connections. Salvador et al. (2005) suggest that local authorities should intervene by 
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environments for the platform to benefit African-based jurisdictions. It will somehow 
solve system connection failures (Madon, 2005; Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 2005). 
Retail agents and fiscal solvency 
As expected, affirmative retail agent activities may generate similarly constructive 
developments in the local entity fiscal solvency drive. The finding which supports 
Hypothesis 2 is in line with previous empirical evidence (Gilbert, 2005; Phillips & Ilcan, 
2007). The agents link the transactional platform to the customer and vice versa, making 
the digital financial inclusion dream almost attain reality. 
In some jurisdictions, say, Tigo Family Care insurance (Ghana), M-Pesa (Kenya), 
and The FirstMonie (Nigeria), retail agents work hand-in-hand with the digital service 
providers to sensitize customers on how to utilize the facilities. It makes customers 
appreciate and embrace the services (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
From the fiscal solvency perspective, the role of e-financial services retail agents 
significantly boosts local revenue collections. It is so as most authorities subject both the 
enhanced customer businesses and the agents to various forms of local charges, fees, and 
taxes (Phillips & Ilcan, 2007; Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
However, it must be stressed that it would be unfair to be adamant on the full 
certainty surrounding the retail agents’ function in the digital financial inclusion-fiscal 
solvency equation. Several studies (e.g., Gilbert, 2005; Madon, 2005; Salvador, Sherry & 
Urrutia, 2005) attribute most failures in the relationship to questionable professional and 
technical competencies and personal conduct of the numberless retail agents. 
For instance, Salvador et al. (2005) noted that most agents find themselves in the 
digital service business as a mere form of temporary employment and a way of making 
money for survival. They lack proper training and hold no intentions of specializing in 
that field. It partially explains why the agents are often less-mindful of customer care and 
customer service, especially when dealing with the largely illiterate communities (Madon, 
2005; Salvador, Sherry & Urrutia, 2005). 
Thus, our Hypothesis 2 and its findings propose that the role played by retail agents 
in the digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency relationship is not the only antecedent 
but, to a very large extent, it is also consequential. Besides, the actor-network theory 
asserts that if no proper and prompt action is taken to mitigate its negative influence, 
agents’ actions may not only delay but can completely frustrate the realization of the e-
financial inclusion dream (Green, Hull, McMeekin & Walsh, 1999; Hanseth, Monteiro & 
Hatling, 1996). It will have very serious repercussions on fiscal solvency in local 
jurisdictional entities. 
Phillips & Ilcan (2007) and Yakub, Bello & Adenuga (2013) suggest that national 
and local authorities should strengthen related regulations and emphasize customer 
sensitization. All retail agents must be trained on how to manage financial resources and 
relate to community-based populations. Moreover, the local authorities must appreciate 
the retail contribution agents make to their budgetary structures and revenue coffers in 
particular. Thus, through the agents, authorities can seek technical advice from digital 
financial service providers on how digital financing can support service delivery (Madon, 
2005; Olayinka, 2015; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). 
Device and fiscal solvency 
The current study predicted that digital financial inclusion's device component 
plays a positive role in local entity fiscal solvency endeavors (Hypothesis 3). In line with 
empirical and theoretical propositions (Gilbert, 2005; Green, Hull, McMeekin & Walsh, 
1999; Hanseth, Monteiro & Hatling, 1996; Salvador et al., 2005), the hypothesis secures 
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In local community settings, northern Uganda’s post-war societies inclusive, 
efficient, and easy-to-operate digital devices play a pivotal role in stimulating digital 
financial inclusion connectivity. It has been especially empowered by the presence of 
numerous network masts erected by service providers almost everywhere in the localities 
(Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
Another quite interesting pattern in the digital device results replicates findings in 
the works of (Madon, 2005; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007; Schneider & Enste, 2000). Mandatory 
registration of user-devices attracts mixed reactions from mobile financial service 
consumers. In northern Uganda, device registration is often interpreted as a strategic 
move by authorities to infringe customer secrecy rights. It exposes customer incomes, 
spending habits, and partisan political stand. Moreover, it could be a deliberate move to 
victimize them regarding the quality of public goods and services offered (Olayinka, 
2015; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007). 
However, where such fears are moderate, connectivity benefits override costs, 
especially concerning fiscal solvency. Thus, Schneider & Enste (2000) recommend that 
responsible communication commissions, institute regulations that emphasize importing 
durable and user-friendly devices that enhance digital financial inclusion efficiency. 
Local entity revenue and budgetary incentives stand to benefit in the long-run (Madon, 
2005; Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
Digital financial inclusion-regulation-fiscal solvency 
Regulation seems to dominate the digital financial inclusion-local entity fiscal 
solvency debate, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 
2015; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). In this research, it was proposed, Hypothesis 4, 
and later found supported by data that regulation is a possible mediator in the digital 
financial inclusion-fiscal solvency make-up. That is to say, existing fiscal laws and 
statutes coupled with those governing digital financial activities, have a serious bearing 
on fiscal solvency's financial inclusion drive and achievement. 
Morawczynski (2009) argues that the mechanical e-financial inclusion vision 
nurtured by most jurisdictions in Africa are not only difficult to attain but also extensively 
hampered by unrealistic regulation governing most local entity beneficiaries. Notably, 
only a handful of national constitutions and their outgrowth sub-national entity laws 
capture digital financial inclusion's volatile operational requirements. It often culminates 
in high transaction platform-retail agent-device abuses with impunity, especially from the 
local government fiscal solvency context (Morawczynski, 2009; Olayinka, 2015). 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current research advances empirical, theoretical, and practical understanding 
of how digital financial inclusion and regulation influence fiscal solvency in local 
government in three ways. Previous studies focused mainly on attaining locality fiscal 
solvency through conventional local revenue collections, grants, and donor support 
(Arzaghi & Henderson, 2005; Sepulveda & Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Today, grants and 
donor aid may not necessarily be a direct function of financial digitalization from the 
local society setting. 
Incomes of local communities are currently severely subjected to the dynamics of 
electronic money transfers and communication. Ultimately, both local incomes and 
related business activities have grown (Olayinka, 2015; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013). 
This study provides the implication, for future empirical deliberations, that admittedly the 
conventional local revenue set-up has consequently expanded and thus requires relevant 
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Furthermore, this perspective advances the actor-network theoretical advocacy 
(Hanseth, Monteiro & Hatling, 1996) for local authorities to embrace digital financial 
inclusion in their agenda to realize the fiscal solvency goal. However, this call has 
received little policy, practice, and empirical attention in the developing countries, 
possibly due to its focus on fiscal efficiency in advanced economies (Phillips & Ilcan, 
2007). 
The findings of this investigation suggest that there is a need for an all-embracing 
theory that captures the financial digitalization-fiscal efficiency-local community 
linkages with a particular focus on the developing world. 
The research was conducted to assess how digital financial inclusion attributes; 
transactional platform, retail agents, and devices initiate change in locality fiscal 
solvency. Suitable scales (Baruch & Holton, 2008; Cohen et al., 2003) were developed 
and validated to quantify participant perceptions of various domains systematically. 
Therefore, the study lays a strong footing for new theoretical and quantitative 
methodological advancements for future digital financial inclusion-fiscal solvency 
investigations. This contribution is significant given that the previous, largely qualitative 
studies (Morawczynski, 2009; Yakub, Bello & Adenuga, 2013), overlooked refined 
measurements that could tap deep into the fiscal solvency formation.  
Third, this study is also relevant for practice in local government. Its findings 
suggest embracing digital financial inclusion in local revenue mobilization and 
management revamps budgeting and service delivery. Authorities need to formulate 
budgets considerate of e-financial inclusion and create mechanisms that promote linkages 
with electronic financial services providers (Green, Hull, McMeekin & Walsh, 1999; 
Hanseth, Monteiro & Hatling, 1996). Local establishments should also advocate for 
enforceable regulation that is particularly tailored to their local fiscal solvency realities 
and flexible enough to accommodate the digital financial inclusion dynamics. 
Despite the above noted contributions of the study to the knowledge body, several 
potential limitations need to be appreciated. First, the research focused on the 
transactional platform, retail agents, and devices as potential predictors of fiscal solvency 
in local government. Although the three dimensions are the most renowned influential 
attributes of digital financial inclusion, rapid developments in the electronic financial 
field (Hanseth, Monteiro & Hatling, 1996; Phillips & Ilcan, 2007) suggest that others are 
not particularly mainstream. 
Failure to exploit such dimensions may have been a setback to fully exploring fiscal 
solvency in local entities. For instance, future studies need to investigate community 
reactions to the widespread construction of communication masts, especially in 
residential neighborhoods. The waves such masts transmit may have serious 
repercussions on the people’s health in the long-run (Phillips & Ilcan, 2007). 
Second, the study largely employed self-report data to validate its scales. A cross-
sectional design was used while construct and discriminant validity were the main focus. 
That set-up was adopted with a view of generating a theoretically well-defined and 
accurate instrument capable of collecting reliable data. However, given that self-report 
data are not very comprehensive (Baruch & Holton, 2008; Creswell, 2003), more value 
is feasible in future research that exploits other research designs. For instance, 
longitudinal design, self-other ratings, objective, and other behavioral outcome 
approaches are good candidates (Cohen et al., 2003). 
Finally, this was a simulation investigation, and its models may likely have been 
over-simplified (Barrett, 2007; Cheung & Lau, 2008). Interpreting over-simplified 
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studies can avoid over-simplification by adopting models with suitable variables for 
better theoretical composition and enhanced methodological posture (Bollen, 1990; 
Cheung & Lau, 2008). 
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